6th Central Pay Commission: Defensible, not defiance

6th Central Pay Commission: Defensible, not defiance

There is little wisdom in writing for a newspaper on an issue on which the editorial and the editor in chief have already given a verdict (‘Chain of command, demand’). But I am motivated by two factors: “national interest” and the words of The Indian Express founder, “Be forthright, be frank, be fearless, whatever the odds. Never hesitate to take a stand if you believe in it. Never hesitate to speak out boldly against the wrongs.”
The issues being debated are: (a) should the services chiefs have represented to the defence minister on the cabinet decision (before implementation) relating to 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC), and (b) the manner in which they informed their command about efforts to get the anomalies resolved and advised them to be patient on the enhanced pay package. Does that construe “a dangerous precedent” and crossing the Laxman Rekha? It is unfortunate that no one has investigated why the chiefs were driven to take this step and who gave the spin of “defiance” to their actions.

Besides the blatant discrimination and injustice done in the constitution of the 6th CPC and in processing its report, despite pleas and caution conveyed by servicemen from inside and ex-servicemen from outside, there is no doubt that pent-up frustration from past experiences would have made the chiefs explain and write to the defence minister.

Many older ex-servicemen have written about the frustrations of the 3rd and the 4th CPC. Let me narrate my experience as vice chief and later as chief of army staff in the processing of the 5th CPC. On receipt of this report, the Government appointed a group of ministers to resolve the anomalies. Despite many unresolved anomalies, including one that had upset parity between the armed forces and police personnel below officer ranks (PBOR), the defence secretary had signed the financial order. I rang up the defence minister, who was in Calcutta that day, and said that these instructions, if released, would cause serious dissatisfaction amongst the rank and file. The minister stopped release of the financial order, discussed the issues with the chiefs next day, and then wrote a letter to the prime minister strongly recommending the desired changes. The new pay scales were held back for some months till major issues concerning PBOR were resolved.

In November ‘97, I wrote to the minister again pointing out the remaining unresolved anomalies, including relativity and functional problems due to...

upgradation of pay scales at additional DGP and DGP level. The Government appointed a high-level committee under the defence secretary to resolve all remaining issues of the 5th CPC, which submitted its report in April 1998. This report was processed by yet another committee under the cabinet secretary for the next 18 months but did not resolve (or did not wish to resolve) all issues. Despite several reminders to the defence minister, many anomalies remain unresolved. Many retired officers took recourse to the courts and won their cases.
Three points are to be noted. One, the pay revision of all armed forces personnel was delayed till the defence minister got major issues resolved, quite similar to what is happening in the present case. Two, no one told us that we had set a bad precedent or crossed a Laxman Rekha. Three, the chiefs would certainly be aware of the frustration and demoralisation caused in the processing of the 5th CPC.

The pressure from the ex-servicemen lobby cannot be denied. Besides the institutional camaraderie, izzat and pensions are closely related to the final 6th CPC award. Ex-servicemen look up to their chiefs for amelioration of all their problems. Another factor is non-implementation of one rank, one pension, a demand that has been publicly accepted by political leaders in the past and present governments.

In processing the present report, I have yet to see any statement by the defence minister or the chiefs that would suggest “defiance”, or words remotely close to it. All three chiefs have repudiated any such suggestion. The letter written by the naval chief merely explains the anomalies issue and advises the rank and file to remain patient because its resolve may take time. My guess is that the “defiance” and “pull up” stories are being deliberately aired by babus responsible for distribution of “information” to journalists. Compared to these babus, the chiefs can offer very little newsy information.

It is surprising that my friend Shekhar Gupta, who not long ago said, “In no other major democracy are the armed forces given so insignificant a role in policy making as in India. In no other country do they accept it with the docility they do in India”, has opined that this show of “defiance” is bound to result in a civilian riposte to take away some autonomy of the future chiefs. That cannot be ruled out. But does it mean...

that the chiefs should never raise or question issues that are so obviously wrong, unjust and bound to have serious impact on the morale of their services? If that be the desirable trait amongst senior officers then I will go one step further and state that such armed forces will never be able to win wars.
Sometime ago, former Defence Minister Jaswant Singh wrote in his book Defending India, “A combative mentality has grown between the service headquarters and the ministry. Such an attitude has its own damaging consequences; the defence ministry, in effect, becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge of the military’s morale; ironic considering that the very reverse of it is their responsibility. The sword arm of the state gets blunted by the state itself. So marked is resistance to change here, and so deep the mutual suspicions, inertia and antipathy, that all efforts at reforming the system have always floundered against a rock of ossified thought.”

The problem is that on the pretext of establishing civilian political supremacy over the military, we have developed a system of bureaucratic control, the like of which does not exist in any other country. If the military loses confidence in such a system, or gets isolated from the policy planning and decision-making process, it would affect its psyche, ethos and capability to advise and perform.

Given today’s rapidly changing geo-strategic environment, it is imperative that we change our mindsets and attitudes, and look beyond narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism. A face-to-face dialogue and military advice are critical for the success of policies concerning military personnel and their missions.

Source: http://www.indianexpress.com